R work demonstrating the asymmetric impact of empathy on altruism and pro-social behavior but not simply selfish or self-focused behavior [57,58]. It is important to note that the prudential dilemma presented in Experiment 3 is impersonal. The high proportion of selfish responders in our current sample compared with previous reports is worthy of further research; this pattern might reflect culturespecific attitudes toward selfish transgressions that do not lead to harm towards specific targets (i.e., cheating in one’s taxes for personal benefit) or, in addition, differences in explicit cultural norms regarding taxes. In an exploratory analysis, we have investigated the relationship between selfish tendencies and endorsement of the utilitarian option in the personal moralEmpathic Concern Predicts Non-Utilitarianismscenario; in brief, participants who Procyanidin B1 biological activity reported that they would not cheat on their taxes also reported that they did not endorse the utilitarian option (Table S3). Future work should also investigate whether personal prudential dilemmas elicit the same pattern as personal moral dilemmas. Future work should examine whether reduced empathic concern also leads to plainly immoral personal behavior.ConclusionsUtilitarian moral judgment in the current study was specifically associated with reduced empathy and not with any of the demographic or cultural variables tested. Moreover, utilitarian moral judgment was determined uniquely by levels of empathic concern, independent of other aspects of empathic responding including personal distress and perspective taking. Levels of empathic concern in “extreme utilitarians” (but not “extreme non-utilitarians”) deviated from the majority of responders. Diminished levels of emotional responding may therefore enable moral utilitarians to consistently favor harmful actions that maximize aggregate welfare. Indeed, how we resolve moral dilemmas may rely not simply on abstract reasoning and cognitive control but also crucially on our empathic concern for potential victims.The Specific Role of Empathic ConcernThe absence of any association between utilitarian moral judgment and any other aspect of empathy in the current study might be surprising given prior accounts. On one account, the affective state elicited in the observer in response to another person’s emotions or experience might lead not only to feelings of warmth and compassion for the target of empathy (empathic concern) but also to self-centered feelings of discomfort triggered by the target (personal distress) [59]. However, personal distress did not predict utilitarian moral judgment in any of the three experiments. This HIV-1 integrase inhibitor 2 supplier result suggests that “extreme utilitarians” differ from the average respondent not in their affective state as a whole, but, rather, in the specific set of emotions that may be elicited for an agent (e.g., empathic concern). Relatedly, the present behavioral pattern suggests it is unlikely for the apparent “hypoaffective state” to result from an enhanced ability to regulate emotions in general; otherwise, we might have seen the same effect for personal distress. That is, utilitarian responders might have exhibited not only reduced empathic concern but also reduced personal distress. It is important to note that this specific effect of empathic concern rules out the possibility that participants who had originally reported higher values on the empathy scale were trying to be consistent in their responses to moral sce.R work demonstrating the asymmetric impact of empathy on altruism and pro-social behavior but not simply selfish or self-focused behavior [57,58]. It is important to note that the prudential dilemma presented in Experiment 3 is impersonal. The high proportion of selfish responders in our current sample compared with previous reports is worthy of further research; this pattern might reflect culturespecific attitudes toward selfish transgressions that do not lead to harm towards specific targets (i.e., cheating in one’s taxes for personal benefit) or, in addition, differences in explicit cultural norms regarding taxes. In an exploratory analysis, we have investigated the relationship between selfish tendencies and endorsement of the utilitarian option in the personal moralEmpathic Concern Predicts Non-Utilitarianismscenario; in brief, participants who reported that they would not cheat on their taxes also reported that they did not endorse the utilitarian option (Table S3). Future work should also investigate whether personal prudential dilemmas elicit the same pattern as personal moral dilemmas. Future work should examine whether reduced empathic concern also leads to plainly immoral personal behavior.ConclusionsUtilitarian moral judgment in the current study was specifically associated with reduced empathy and not with any of the demographic or cultural variables tested. Moreover, utilitarian moral judgment was determined uniquely by levels of empathic concern, independent of other aspects of empathic responding including personal distress and perspective taking. Levels of empathic concern in “extreme utilitarians” (but not “extreme non-utilitarians”) deviated from the majority of responders. Diminished levels of emotional responding may therefore enable moral utilitarians to consistently favor harmful actions that maximize aggregate welfare. Indeed, how we resolve moral dilemmas may rely not simply on abstract reasoning and cognitive control but also crucially on our empathic concern for potential victims.The Specific Role of Empathic ConcernThe absence of any association between utilitarian moral judgment and any other aspect of empathy in the current study might be surprising given prior accounts. On one account, the affective state elicited in the observer in response to another person’s emotions or experience might lead not only to feelings of warmth and compassion for the target of empathy (empathic concern) but also to self-centered feelings of discomfort triggered by the target (personal distress) [59]. However, personal distress did not predict utilitarian moral judgment in any of the three experiments. This result suggests that “extreme utilitarians” differ from the average respondent not in their affective state as a whole, but, rather, in the specific set of emotions that may be elicited for an agent (e.g., empathic concern). Relatedly, the present behavioral pattern suggests it is unlikely for the apparent “hypoaffective state” to result from an enhanced ability to regulate emotions in general; otherwise, we might have seen the same effect for personal distress. That is, utilitarian responders might have exhibited not only reduced empathic concern but also reduced personal distress. It is important to note that this specific effect of empathic concern rules out the possibility that participants who had originally reported higher values on the empathy scale were trying to be consistent in their responses to moral sce.